Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Elaine Craig

2009

Ten Years After Ewanchuk The Art of Seduction is
Alive And Well: An Examination of The Mistaken
Belief in Consent Defence
Elaine Craig

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/elaine_craig/7/

Forthcoming: Canadian Criminal Law Review (2009) 13-3
DRAFT

Ten Years After Ewanchuk The Art of Seduction is Alive And Well: An
Examination of The Mistaken Belief in Consent Defence
Elaine Craig1a

It has been a decade since the Supreme Court of Canada released its controversial
decision in R. v. Ewanchuk. One of the central doctrinal issues raised by critics of
Ewanchuk was a concern that it would not sufficiently allow for the mistaken belief
defence in cases involving ‘morally innocent’ accused engaged in typical sexual
overtures or in cases where the accused and complainant were in an ongoing sexual
relationship at the time of the offence. A review of the reported cases, since 1998,
demonstrates that the Ewanchuk analysis, properly interpreted, does not unjustly
criminalize the progression of intimate behavior between genuinely consenting adults.
Less promisingly, the post-Ewanchuk case law also suggests that in circumstances
involving intimate partners or spouses, trial judges may be more likely to wrongly rely on
the assumption that as between spouses the doctrine of implied consent still exists.
Ewanchuk, it seems, has achieved better respect from the law for the sexual integrity of
the intoxicated party-goer. The trial decisions discussed in the last section of this paper
suggest Ewanchuk has been less able to achieve this with respect to the sexual integrity
of wives and girlfriends.

Introduction
It has been a decade since the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in R
v Ewanchuk.1 Ewanchuk, which remains the leading precedent on the interpretation of
consent in the context of sexual assault, was a controversial decision2 and has been the
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JSD(c) and Trudeau Scholar. Thank-you to Stephen Coughlan and Ronalda Murphy for
invaluable assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1 [1999] 1 SCR 330 [hereinafter Ewanchuk].
2 Ewanchuk was controversial not simply for its doctrinal implications but also due to reactions stemming
from Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s concurring opinion responding to Justice McLung’s decision in the case at
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subject of some scholarly debate.3 Given the degree of controversy that surrounded the
Ewanchuk decision, and in particular the suggestion that the Supreme Court of Canada
had swung the pendulum too far towards the ‘radical feminist agenda’ and away from the
rights of the accused, it seems prudent to revisit the decision to determine whether these
concerns have been born out.
As will be discussed below, Ewanchuk adopted a subjective notion of consent
under the actus reus analysis for sexual assault, in conjunction with a communicative or
performative notion of consent under the mens rea analysis. One of the central doctrinal
issues raised by critics of Ewanchuk was a concern that it would not sufficiently allow for
the mistaken belief defence in cases involving ‘morally innocent’ accused engaged in
typical sexual overtures4 or in cases where the accused and complainant were in an
ongoing sexual relationship at the time of the offence.5
However, a review of the reported decisions addressing the mistaken belief in
consent defence since Ewanchuk indicates that while sex may be complex6, and while it

the Alberta Court of Appeal (1998), 57 Alta. L.R. (3d) 235). It is the former debate and not the latter that
will be the focus of this discussion. For a discussion regarding the latter controversy surrounding Ewanchuk
see Joanne Wright, “Consent and Sexual Violence in Canadian Public Discourse : Reflections on
Ewanchuk” (2001) 16 No. 2 Can J L&S 173; Constance Backhouse, “The Chilly Climate for Women
Judges: Reflections on the Backlash from the Ewanchuk Case” (2003) 15 Can. J. Women & L. 167; Hester
Lessard, “Farce or Tragedy? Judicial Backlash and Justice McClung" (1999) 10 Constitutional Forum 65;
Edward L. Greenspan, "Judges Have No Right to Be Bullies," National Post (2 March 1999) A18.
3 See Christine Boyle, “Sexual Assault as Foreplay: Does Ewanchuk Apply to Spouses” (2004) 20 C.R.
(6th) 359; Lucinda Vandervort, “Honest Beliefs, Credible Lies, and Culpable Awareness: Rhetoric,
Inequality, and Mens Rea in Sexual Assault” (2004) 42 Osgoode Hall L.J. 625; Don Stuart, “Ewanchuk:
Asserting "No Means No" at the Expense of Fault and Proportionality Principles” (1999) 22 C.R. (5th) 39
[hereinafter “Ewanchuk: Asserting “No Means No”].
4
Stuart, “Ewanchuk: Asserting “No Means No”, supra note 3.
5
See for example Criminal Review.CA R v Ashlee (http://criminalreview.ca/index.php/
2006/08/24/ r-v-ashlee accessed January 30, 2009); see also Justice Thomas’s decision in R v R.V.,
[2004] O.J. 849 (varied [2004] O.J. 5136 (C.A.) stating that in cases involving spouses the doctrine
of implied consent should still be considered; see R v Went, [2004] B.C.J. No. 190 where the
British Columbia Supreme Court also suggested this – but then went on to apply the principles of
Ewanchuk regardless.
6
In “Ewanchuk: Asserting “No Means No”, supra note 3, Stuart cites several decisions
recognizing the “complex and diverse nature of consent” to sexual touching.
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may well be difficult for courts to wade into the morass of ongoing sexual relationships,
judges do appear able to apply the definition of consent adopted in Ewanchuk (a
definition which better protects complainants) in a manner which recognizes the
complexity and diversity of sexual dynamics without resulting in the sort of injustices to
the accused that were once suggested by the decision’s critics. The jurisprudence since
Ewanchuk demonstrates that, despite fears to the contrary, the ‘art of seduction’ has not
yet been criminalized in Canada. In fact, a review of the post-Ewanchuk case law
suggests that in cases involving allegations of sexual assault by an accused against a
long-term intimate partner Ewanchuk has not swung the pendulum far enough. The trial
decisions discussed in the last section suggest that in circumstances involving intimate
partners or spouses, trial judges may be more willing to resort to reasoning that wrongly
relies on the assumption that as between spouses the doctrine of implied consent still
exists. Ewanchuk, has provided a definition of consent which offers hope for the better
protection of the intoxicated party goer. It seems Ewanchuk has been less able to achieve
this with respect to the sexual integrity of wives and girlfriends.
The discussion below will be broken into three parts. The first part will consist of
a brief review of the doctrinal implications flowing from the Ewanchuk decision. To
follow that will be a discussion addressing the concern that the Ewanchuk definition of
consent risks criminalizing harmless sexual overtures by convicting individuals lacking a
sufficiently guilty mind. It will demonstrate that this concern has not been realized both
because the types of cases envisaged by critics have not appeared before the courts and
because even if they did arise a proper application of Ewanchuk would not result in the
conviction of a morally innocent accused.
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The third part will address the fear that Ewanchuk’s rejection of the doctrine of
implied consent could unjustly convict accused who were involved in an on going sexual
relationship with the complainant at the time of the alleged offence. This part will
demonstrate that lower courts have applied the definition of consent established in
Ewanchuk in a manner that acknowledges that consent is communicated differently in
different types of sexual relationships. It will also reveal that in some cases where the
complainant and the accused had been engaged in a long-term intimate relationship, trial
judges have either refused to apply or, failed to properly apply, Ewanchuk.
I.

The Ewanchuk Decision
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ewanchuk affirmed two significant

and interrelated conceptual changes to the doctrine of consent in sexual assault law.7 The
first was the rejection of any notion of implied consent.8 Ewanchuk determined that in
any sexual interaction, either there is or there is not consent to the sexual touching and
this will be determined based on direct and/or indirect evidence of the complainant’s state
of mind at the time of the alleged assault.9
The second principle affirmed in Ewanchuk was the characterization of consent in the
affirmative rather than the negative - the stipulation that consent means indicating yes
rather than not indicating no.10 Prior to the Court’s decision in Ewanchuk the consent
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Ewanchuk, supra note 1. The interpretation of consent adopted in Ewanchuk had already been
adopted in earlier concurrences or dissents and in lower court decisions. See for example R v
Park, [1995] 2 SCR 836; R v Esua, [1997] 2 SCR 777; R v MLM, [1994] 2 SCR 3.
8
Ibid. at para. 31.
9
Both at common law (Ewanchuk, supra note 1 at para. 36) and under s.273.1 of the Criminal
Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, consent must be freely given in order to be legally effective. Duress,
abuse of trust, and coercion all vitiate consent to sexual touching.
10
Ewanchuk, ibid. Justice Major in Ewanchuk quotes from para. 39 of Justice L’Heureux-Dube’s
concurring opinion in R v Park, supra note 7: “the mens rea of sexual assault is not only satisfied
when it is shown that the accused knew that the complainant was essentially saying “no”, but is
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element of the mens rea for sexual assault required that the accused believe that the
complainant was not consenting.11 In other words a guilty mind was a mind that knew
that (or was reckless or willfully blind as to whether) the complainant had withheld
consent. Ewanchuk established that the accused, to be morally innocent, must have
believed that the complainant indicated consent through words or conduct. For the
purposes of determining mens rea, consent is now established based on the accused’s
perception of the complainant’s words or actions and not on the accused’s perception as
to the complainant’s desire for sexual contact.12 It is a communicative definition of
consent.13 This means that the accused’s belief that a complainant did not say no will not
exculpate the accused nor will his belief that she said no but meant yes. It also means
that a complainant’s passivity is not a defence.14 In other words, it is only a mistaken
belief that the complainant communicated consent that will raise a reasonable doubt as to
mens rea - not a mistaken belief that the complainant was consenting.
also satisfied when it is shown that the accused knew that the complainant was essentially not
saying “yes”.”
11
See R v Pappajohn, [1980] 2 SCR 120 at 140: “the essence of the crime consists in the
commission of an act of sexual intercourse where a woman's consent, or genuine consent, has been
withheld”. See also Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 570; R v Robertson, [1987] 1 SCR
918.
12
Ewanchuk, supra note 1 at para. 46. “In order to cloak the accused’s actions in moral
innocence, the evidence must show that he believed that the complainant communicated consent to
engage in the sexual activity in question.”
13
For a description of the distinction between communicative (or performative) notions of consent
and attitudinal notions of consent see Nathan Brett, “Sexual Offenses and Consent” (1998), 11
Can. J. Law. & Juris. 69. Note that Brett endorses adopting a communicative notion of consent in
terms of establishing both the mens rea and the actus reus. The Court in Ewanchuk did not adopt a
communicative notion of consent with respect to the actus reus.
14
The Court had earlier affirmed the rather significant point that passivity or silence did not
constitute consent in an unremarkable one paragraph decision overturning the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal. (R v MLM [1994] 2 SCR 3.) In addition, section 265(3) of the Criminal Code defining
consent as a defence to assault (including sexual assault) stipulates that no consent is obtained
where the complainant submits or does not resist by reason of the application of force, threats or
fear of the application of force, fraud or the exercise of authority. As noted by Justice L’HeureuxDube in Ewanchuk, at para. 86, this supports the finding that passivity or silence does not
constitute consent. In addition, as established by section 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code, the
defence will not be available where the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances
known to the accused at the time, to ascertain consent.
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II.

Preserving the Art of Seduction – A Kiss Is Still A Kiss
There were two main critiques regarding the doctrinal implications of the Court’s

decision in Ewanchuk. Both stemmed from the proposition that the Court’s interpretation
of consent would overly restrict the defence of mistaken belief in consent. The first
relates to Justice Major’s determination that an accused’s reliance on silence or
ambiguous conduct as an indication of consent is a mistake of law, and therefore not a
defence. The concern was that this could result in the criminalization of harmless sexual
overtures in ambiguous cases where “there is a real issue of whether a sexual assault
occurred”.15 This concern is well illustrated by the hypothetical situations Professor
Stuart suggested could problematically result in conviction post-Ewanchuk:
Situation 1: Two teenagers, Jack and Jill, have their first date at the movies. After
the movies they go to Jack's apartment for coffee. They talk. Jill tells Jack that
she has a boyfriend but also that she is an open, friendly, and affectionate person;
and that she often likes to touch people. Jack tells her that he is an open, friendly,
and affectionate person; and that he often likes to touch people. They talk more.
They touch each other; they hug. At some point Jack kisses Jill. Jack thinks she
has responded positively to his sexual advance although nothing was said. Jill did
not welcome the kiss and felt she did nothing to encourage Jack. She was not
scared of him. She admits that at that point she opened two buttons of her blouse
but this was because she felt claustrophobic and nothing else. Jack felt he was
being encouraged by her action and touched her breasts. Jill slaps him.
Situation 2: The same as situation 1, except that it was Jill who kissed Jack.16
In the first situation, the concern was that under Ewanchuk, “since the complainant did
not communicate her consent to be kissed or for her breasts to be touched, it would
appear that the accused has no defence whatever he thought”.17 Additionally, “there could
be no defence of mistaken belief even in the second hypothetical since the opening of the
blouse was ambiguous conduct and belief that ambiguous conduct constitutes consent is a
15

Stuart, “Ewanchuk: Asserting “No Means No”, supra note 3.
Ibid.
17
Stuart, Ewanchuk: Asserting “No Means No”, supra note 3.
16
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mistake of law.”18 Critics suggested that if the Court’s proposition in Ewanchuk that the
presence of consent is determined solely on the subjective perspective of the complainant
and if mistaking silence, passivity or ambiguity for consent is a mistake of law and
therefore not a defence, an accused could be convicted of sexual assault simply for
pursuing a sexual encounter in a manner in which sexual encounters are quite commonly
pursued and innocently carried out. In other words, the Court will have criminalized
seduction in Canada.19
However, the decade worth of case law that has applied Ewanchuk in cases
involving claims of honest but mistaken belief in consent demonstrates that i) the types of
situations with which Ewanchuk’s critics were concerned have not actually been brought
before the courts; and ii) were a truly ambiguous situation of this nature to come before a
court a proper interpretation of Ewanchuk would not result in a conviction.20
The following offers a hypothetical that much more aptly reflects the type of
ambiguous situations that have come before the courts in mistaken belief cases postEwanchuk:
Situation 1: Two teenagers, Jack and Jill, both attend a mutual friend’s house
party. Jill, an inexperienced drinker, consumes a great deal of alcohol. Jack also
consumes alcohol. As the party progresses, Jill becomes increasingly intoxicated
to the point where her friends take her upstairs and put her to bed in one of the
host’s bedrooms. Jill passes out. After the party has wound down, Jack heads
upstairs, finds Jill in bed and proceeds to roll her over, and remove her pants. As
Jack is pulling Jill’s pants down he notices Jill lift her hips slightly. Jack
interprets this as an indication of her willingness. Jack begins to fondle Jill’s
breasts and then her genitals. Jill fades in and out of consciousness as this is
occurring. At one point Jill moans. Jill awakens to find that Jack has inserted his
18

Ibid.
Ibid.
20
Searches were conducted on both the Quicklaw database and Westlaw database using the
following search terms: “Ewanchuk” and “mistaken belief”. All reported decisions that included
both of these search terms were reviewed. Quicklaw produced 165 cases (last accessed January
23, 2009). Westlaw produced 156 cases (last accessed January 23, 2009).
19
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penis into Jill’s vagina. Jill immediately passes out again. Shortly thereafter Jack
ejaculates.
Situation 2: The same as situation 1 except, earlier in the evening before Jill
passes out, Jack and Jill flirt and Jill kisses Jack.
A remarkably (and disturbingly) high number of the post-Ewanchuk reported
decisions involving cases where a claim of mistaken belief in consent was denied closely
resemble the factual circumstances highlighted in the hypothetical situation just
described.21 In fact, situations quite similar to those I have just described constitute the
most common factual circumstances in all of the reported decisions where the mistaken
belief defence is raised and rejected.22 In these cases, the silence or passivity of the
complainant stems from unconsciousness not coyness or indecisiveness. ‘Ambiguity’
arises in these cases not from a pubescent and gendered confusion over the complainant’s
(lack of) sexual interest but rather from a sleeping or barely conscious complainant who
moans23, rolls over24, or lifts her hips slightly25 while the accused is disrobing, fondling
or penetrating her. It is not that critics of Ewanchuk suggested that denying the defence
of mistaken belief in consent in these types of cases posed a problem. However, the
practical reality is that these are the types of cases in which the principle in Ewanchuk

21

See for example R v H(S.L.), [2003] S.J. No. 645; R v J.A.., [2003] O.J. No. 2803; R v Cedeno
[2005] O.J. No. 1174; R v J.R., [2006] O.J. No. 2698; R v G.A.L., [2001] N.S.J. No. 54; R v A.J.
(2003), Carswell Ont 2624; R v Ashlee, [2006] A.J. No. 1040; R v Reichmuth, [2007] CarswellBC
592; R v Despins, [2007] S.J. No. 577; R v Dumais, [2008] S.J. No. 323; R v B.S.B., [2008] B.C.J.
No. 1319; R v Doll, [2004] B.C.J. No. 285; R v Morningchild, [2004] S.J. No. 126; R v Bird,
[2004] A.J. No. 449; R v Cornejo, [2003] O.J. No. 4517; R v K.D. [2001] N.J. No. 347; R v P.D.,
[2002] O.J. No. 3593; R v Baynes, [2007] O.J. No. 633; R v Luddington, (2001) 191 N.S.R. (2d)
118; R v Malcolm, [2000] M.J. No. 387; R v Vaillancourt, [2007] O.J. No. 3471.
22
Ibid.
23
See R v Doll, [2004] B.C.J. No. 285 (In fact, in Doll the court determined that her moaning and
lifting of the hips did raise an air of reality to the defence. However, it was not sufficient to
establish the defence.); R v Despins, [2007] S.J. No. 577; R v Baynes, [2007] O.J. No. 633; R v
K.D., [2001] N.J. No. 347
24
See R v S.T. [1999] O.J. No. 268.
25
See R v Cornejo, [2003] O.J. No. 4517.
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that silence, passivity and ambiguity do not connote consent has most commonly been
applied.
The counter argument to this practical observation regarding the types of cases
that actually do come before the courts is that it does not matter whether the type of case
critics feared has yet come before the courts; the significance of the critique is established
simply by the possibility that an accused could be convicted without the degree of fault
required by fundamental criminal law principles. This counter argument raises the
second point demonstrated by the post-Ewanchuk cases. Under a proper interpretation of
Ewanchuk, were a truly ambiguous situation in which an accused relied on a
complainant’s conduct as an indication to proceed incrementally to come before the
court, it would not result in a conviction.
It may be that some of the concerns raised by critics of Ewanchuk involved a
misapprehension of the test established in Ewanchuk. As noted above, Professor Stuart
suggested that in his first hypothetical situation “since the complainant did not
communicate her consent to be kissed or for her breasts to be touched, it would appear
that the accused has no defence whatever he thought”.26 Ewanchuk does not require that
the complainant communicated consent in order to allow the defence of honest but
mistaken belief in consent. To do so would remove entirely the subjective component of
the mens rea for sexual assault. Rather, Ewanchuk determined that in order to establish
the defence there must be evidence to lend an air of reality to the suggestion that the
accused believed that the complainant communicated consent.

26

Stuart, Ewanchuk: Asserting “No Means No”, supra note 3.
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The belief that consent was communicated can be based on the complainant’s
words or actions.27 Ewanchuk has not been taken to stand for the proposition that an
individual engaged in sexual activity with a genuinely consenting partner can never rely
on a kiss as evidence of an honest but mistaken belief that consent for further kissing had
been communicated, or rely on further consensual kissing as evidence of a mistaken
belief that consent to some initial intimate touching was communicated through conduct
and so on.... In cases where a complainant has consented to some sexual touching, courts
have allowed the accused to rely on this as evidence of a mistaken belief that consent to
progress (incrementally) was communicated. This is provided there was not some
affirmative indication that consent had been withdrawn nor behavior on the part of the
accused that was not incremental nor some other factor that the accused should have
reasonably known suggested the complainant was no longer consenting -which would
then require him to take further steps to ascertain consent. The concern that Ewanchuk
would result in the unjust conviction of an accused who has commenced consensual
sexual touching that unbeknownst to him at some point becomes unwanted (but
unexpressed) by the complainant has not been realized. In those seemingly rare
circumstances where an actual and reasonable ambiguity existed courts have adopted an
approach that most certainly favours the accused. Unfortunately, in some such cases

27

So for example, applying this aspect of Ewanchuk’s reasoning to Professor Stuart’s hypothetical,
in the first situation, evidence that Jill hugged and touched Jack would be evidence that Jack could
rely upon to lend an air of reality to the belief that Jill communicated consent for the kiss
(regardless of whether Jill intended the hug and touching to communicate consent for the kiss). In
both situations, evidence that subsequent to the kissing Jill then unbuttoned her blouse would be
evidence that Jack could rely upon to establish a belief that Jill communicated consent for the
touching of her breasts (regardless of whether Jill intended the unbuttoning of her blouse to
communicate consent for the breast touching). These facts would potentially raise an air of reality
such that the defence could be put to the jury. Again, it should be emphasized that, to date, the
circumstances in which individuals are prosecuted for sexual assault much more closely resemble
the ugly hypothetical that I described earlier- not the one described by Professor Stuart.
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courts have even required evidence that the complainant indicated a withdrawal of
consent before rejecting the possibility of an honest but mistaken belief in consent – a
requirement that is inconsistent with Ewanchuk.
The case of R v Kuryluk, is an example of such unfortunate reasoning. In R v
Kuryluk, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court acquitted the accused after finding that there
was a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainant had communicated her withdrawal
of consent to further sexual activity.28 In Kuryluk the complainant and the accused,
former lovers, returned to the accused’s apartment after having been re-acquainted at a
bar. Once at the apartment the two engaged in consensual kissing and fondling which
then progressed to mutual oral sex. After the oral sex, vaginal intercourse occurred.
Kuryluk testified that he believed the complainant consented to all activity short of
ejaculation during intercourse. The complainant testified that the mutual oral sex was not
consensual but that she had not indicated this to the accused and that she had said no to
the vaginal intercourse. The Court found that “[a]lthough his belief may have been
mistaken, Mr. Kuryluk's evidence that he believed the complainant consented to engage
in the sexual activity performed, albeit without ejaculation, supports the defence of
honest but mistaken belief”.29 The evidence raised “a reasonable doubt that lack of
consent was communicated to the accused with respect to any act other than accidental
ejaculation, which alone does not amount to a sexual assault”.30 There was conflicting
evidence as to whether the complainant said no to the intercourse. Justice Murphy found
the accused credible on this point.

28

[2001] N.S.J. No. 545.
Ibid. at para. 32
30
Ibid. at para. 35.
29
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Based on the consensual kissing, fondling and disrobing that preceded it, and her
testimony that she went along with it, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court found that the
evidence did not indicate that the oral sex was a sexual assault. In doing so the court
noted that the Crown had acknowledged that the complainant did not communicate to the
accused that she was not consenting to oral sex.31 It was the fact that she had not
communicated non-consent for the oral sex that was highlighted. While the incremental
aspect of the court’s analysis is promising – as discussed below in the context of other
cases – in Kuryluk the court wrongly applied the law. According to Ewanchuk and
section 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code an accused’s mistaken belief in consent cannot be
based on a complainant’s failure to withdraw consent to oral sex or sexual intercourse.
Having wrongly applied the law, the court’s analysis regarding the complainant’s
credibility was, as a result, also misguided. Inconsistencies in her testimony as to
whether or not she communicated non-consent are less relevant under a proper
application of Ewanchuk and section 273.2(b).
In R v Anderson, the accused and the complainant met in a bar where they hugged
and kissed briefly. The Ontario Court of Justice found that this was consensual hugging
and kissing. 32 The accused and the complainant then exited the bar and while outside
continued kissing and touching. The Court found that this too was consensual. The two
then went around to the side of the building and lowered themselves onto the ground
where kissing and some fondling ensued. The Crown conceded that the complainant
31

Ibid. at para. 25
[2005] O.J. No. 5381. The complainant’s and the accused’s versions of events after having left
the bar were different. The complainant testified that she had said no. Justice Brophy found both
witnesses to be reliable and as is required by the presumption of innocence, gave the benefit of the
doubt to the accused (R v. W.(D.), (1991), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 397). Presumably, had he been
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant had indicated ‘no’ to further sexual
touching he would not have acquitted Anderson.
32
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consented to the initial kissing and hugging that occurred outside the bar. The accused
was acquitted on the basis that the Crown had not proven lack of consent. The Court
further held that even had the Crown established lack of consent beyond a reasonable
doubt the accused would have been entitled to rely on a mistaken belief in consent.
Justice Brophy stated that
if the complainant then changed her mind (which I find the Crown has not
proven beyond a reasonable doubt), there is obviously a transitional period where
that change of mind is going to have to be communicated in some fashion to the
accused. In that transitional period, it is quite possible for the accused to have
held an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant was still consenting to his
actions. I am of the view that the accused stopped his actions when it became
clear that the complainant wished to leave. At that point there was a message
being sent that she wished to stop and the accused did in fact end his sexual
advances.33
The court in Anderson also erred in its approach to the law of consent. Like in
Kurlyuk the court wrongly assumed that a defence of mistaken belief could be made out
on the basis that the complainant had failed to communicate a withdrawal of consent.
However, also as in Kurlyuk there is an element of the reasoning – its incremental
analysis of the facts surrounding consent – that is promising. Setting aside purportedly
ambiguous factual circumstances where the court wrongly applied Ewanchuk, what
happens in ambiguous factual circumstances where the post-Ewanchuk law is properly
applied?
In the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia’s decision in R v MacIsaac the appellant’s
conviction for sexual assault was overturned on the basis that the trial judge had erred by
not considering the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent. 34 The appellant
testified at trial that he had visited the home of a woman with whom he was acquainted.
33
34

R v Anderson, supra note 32 at para. 38.
[2005] N.S.J. No. 126 [hereinafter MacIsaac].
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While there he hugged the complainant twice; the second time he followed the hug with a
brief kiss on the lips. The following day she made a complaint of sexual assault to the
police. The appellant testified that he did not ask permission to hug her or to kiss her.
Presumably given the trial verdict, the trial judge had made a finding of fact that the
complainant did not consent to the hug or kiss. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nova
Scotia found that the trial judge had failed to properly apply Ewanchuk and that the
evidence clearly raised the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent. The
evidence the Court was referring to included the appellant’s testimony that after he put
his arm around the complainant, as they were walking to the door, she responded by
putting her arms around him. It included the appellant’s evidence that when he hugged
her she took her shoulders and titled them forward, burying them into his chest. It
included his evidence that the kiss on the lips lasted approximately one second, that he
did not use tongue and that when she broke off the kiss and informed him she “didn’t
want to go through with this” he did not engage in any further overtures.35
Applying Ewanchuk, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia found that the mistaken
belief in consent defence was available based on this evidence. A returned hug and a
tilting of the shoulders, regardless of what the complaint meant to communicate, was
sufficient evidence, if believed, to establish a mistaken belief that the complainant had
communicated consent for the kiss. That is to say, presuming his evidence was believed,
Mr. MacIsaac’s sexual overtures were not criminalized.
The key in cases of the type just discussed is the notion of incremental conduct
and the possibility of consent through words or conduct. Ewanchuk established that there
must be an affirmative unequivocal indication of consent to sexual touching. It
35

Supra note 34 at para. 14.
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established that any adverse indication requires an accused to cease all sexual advances
until a clear and unequivocal affirmative indication is subsequently obtained. It also
established that “an unequivocal “yes” may be given by either the spoken word or by
conduct”. MacIsaac demonstrates that it is possible to apply this approach to consent in a
way that does not unjustly deny the defence in truly ambiguous cases.
In Anderson, reasoning consistent with Ewanchuk would have focused on the
presence or lack of indication of ‘yes’ during the ‘transitional period’ that the accused
might have relied upon, or an examination of steps he should have taken to ensure
consent was still present. Similarly in Kuryluk, the court’s analysis regarding the
mistaken belief in consent defence for the mutual oral sex, should have focused on what,
if any, evidence the accused might have mistakenly relied upon to belief that she had
communicated consent. In some cases it might be consistent with Ewanchuk to allow the
accused (absent any indication by the complainant to the contrary) to rely on the
consensual mutual kissing as evidence of a belief that the kissing communicated consent
for fondling, on the consensual mutual fondling as evidence of a belief that the fondling
communicated consent for the disrobing, and on the consensual mutual disrobing (in
conjunction with all of the prior consensual activity) as evidence of a mistaken belief that
consent for the mutual oral sex had been communicated. Whether this will be the case
will depend on what steps the accused took, given the circumstances known to the
accused at the time, at each incremental stage in the progression of sexual intimacy. In a
case where the accused and the complainant were not in an ongoing sexual relationship,
or where the accused was aware the complainant had been drinking or where they were
about to engage in unsafe sex, reasonable steps might require more than mere reliance on
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the immediately prior sexual act. It may also be that the more involved the sexual contact
the more steps required. So for example a kiss might well be reasonably relied upon
under section 273.2(b) as evidence of a mistaken belief in consent for further kissing but
mutual oral sex may very well not be enough under section 273.2(b) to establish that
reasonable steps were taken to ascertain that consent to sexual intercourse was
communicated.
In the great preponderance of cases dealing with claims of honest but mistaken
belief in consent between strangers and acquaintances the ‘ambiguities’ argued by the
defence stem from severely intoxicated complainants not crossed wires. Cases such as
MacIsaac demonstrate that where there is some legitimate confusion stemming from the
transition period between consensual sexual touching and the lack of consent to
incrementally progress to more involved sexual touching courts have not applied
Ewanchuk in a manner that unjustly denies the possibility of the defence.
III.

Mistaken Belief in Consent in On Going Sexual Relationships
Having dispensed with the apprehension that Ewanchuk would lead to the

criminalization of seduction, it is necessary to turn to the second main doctrinal concern
voiced by opponents of the decision. This was the suggestion that Ewanchuk, by
rejecting the doctrine of implied consent to sexual touching, would result in the unjust
conviction of accused who were involved in an on going sexual relationship with the
complainant at the time of the alleged offence. The concern was that the Ewanchuk
reasoning would not give adequate recognition to the manner in which consent to sexual
interaction often occurs in the context of on going intimate relationships.
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A review of the cases applying Ewanchuk in which an accused claims a mistaken
belief in consent in defence of sexual assault allegations made by a complainant with
whom he was involved in an on going sexual relationship demonstrate that this concern
also has not been realized. In fact the post-Ewanchuk cases reveal that lower courts are
quite able to apply the communicative notion of consent adopted in Ewanchuk in a
manner that recognizes and accounts for both the fact that consent is often communicated
differently between long or longer term sexual partners than it is between strangers or
shorter term sexual partners as well as the diverse ways in which consent can be
communicated within the context of an ongoing sexual relationship. These cases
demonstrate that the communicative definition of consent can be properly applied in
cases involving intimate partners.
Unfortunately there are also lower court cases indicating that if anything, the
criminal law, despite Ewanchuk, has failed to provide the same level of protection for
sexual autonomy inside intimate relationships as it has finally begun to provide to the
intoxicated party goer.36 As will be discussed, the rejection of the doctrine of implied
consent by the Supreme Court of Canada has not been consistently applied by lower
courts in cases involving spouses.
The paragraphs to follow will focus on three issues: i) the use of prior sexual
history in cases involving intimate partners; ii) cases where the couple had, or the
accused claims they had, a history of consensual sado-masochistic or ‘rough’ sex and; iii)
cases where the sexual interaction arose in circumstances where the relationship was in
jeopardy.
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See Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault in Spousal Relationships, "Continuous Consent”, and the
Law: Honest But Mistaken Judicial Beliefs”, (2008) 32 Man. L.J. 144.
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i) Prior Sexual History In Cases of Sexual Assault Between Intimates
Many of the cases in which claims of mistaken belief in consent defences to
sexual assault charges in the context of on going relationships arise also involve
applications by the defence under section 276 of the Criminal Code to introduce the
couple’s prior sexual history. The first indication that those accused of sexually
assaulting an intimate partner will not be unjustly denied the mistaken belief in consent
defence is revealed by the courts’ liberal (and at times problematic from the perspective
of the crown37) approach to the use of prior sexual history in these circumstances.
Justice McLachlin (as she then was) noted in R v Seaboyer that prior sexual history
between the complainant and the accused may be relevant to a claim of mistaken belief in
consent.38 To be admitted under section 276 of the Criminal Code the prior sexual
history must not be introduced as evidence that the complainant was more likely to
consent or as evidence of her credibility generally; in addition, it must have significant
probative value relevant to an issue at trial.39 In R v Darrach Justice Gonthier noted that
[t]o establish that the complainant's prior sexual activity is relevant to his
mistaken belief during the alleged assault, the accused must provide some
evidence of what he believed at the time of the alleged assault. This is necessary
for the trial judge to be able to assess the relevance of the evidence in accordance
with the statute.40
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It has been argued that, problematically, “past sexual history seems to figure more prominently
and slip in automatically in spousal sexual assault cases” rather than through a proper section 276
process. See Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault in Spousal Relationships, "Continuous Consent”,
and the Law: Honest But Mistaken Judicial Beliefs”, supra note 39.
38
(1991), 66 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.), at pg. 407.
39
Ibid.
40
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 at para. 59.
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In light of the definition of consent adopted in Ewanchuk, courts could have taken
a strict interpretive approach to the admission of prior sexual history in these cases by
finding that it will only have significant probative value where it is evidence of how
consent was communicated through words or conduct in the past. In fact such an
approach would be a more appropriate interpretation of the interplay between the
requirements of section 276 and the mens rea definition of consent established in
Ewanchuk.41 However, courts have tended to interpret the relationship between a
mistaken belief in consent defence post-Ewanchuk and an application to introduce
evidence of a prior sexual history between the accused and the complainant in a manner
that favours the accused, such that the prior sexual history, provided it is recent,42 tends to
be admitted.43

41

See Janine Benedet, Case Comment R v B.(A.J.) (2007) Carswell Man 300:
if the focus of the mistaken belief defence is on whether the complainant communicated her
voluntary agreement to the accused, the only past history that is arguably relevant would relate to
how voluntary agreement was communicated by the complainant to the accused in the past.
See R. v. Mondesir (2004), CarswellOnt 6405. In Mondesir the Ontario Superior Court did apply
this interpretation to deny an application to admit evidence of a prior ‘kinky’ sexual incident on
the basis that during the previous ‘kinky’ sexual interaction the complainant had instructed the
accused as to what she wanted him to do. During the alleged assault she was silent.
42
See R v Power [1999] N.S.J. No. 269; R v Kynoch [2002] A.J. No. 1256 at para. 42 where
evidence of prior sexual history was not admitted because there had been a lapse in time between
the history of sexual touching and the present alleged offence. Even the reasoning in these cases
demonstrates how courts have interpreted the interplay between section 276 and Ewanchuk in a
manner favorable to the accused. The assumption underpinning these rulings is that the prior
sexual history – given the lapse in time - is not relevant because it does not support the inference
that the accused was reasonable in relying on the fact of prior sexual relations to support a belief in
present consent.
43
This observation should be qualified somewhat. In many cases the accused claims that the
complainant consented or in the alternative that he had a mistaken belief that she consented.
Courts do not always indicate, at the section 276 application stage, whether evidence of prior
sexual history is being admitted as relevant to the former or the latter or both. (See for example R
v G.P. [2008] O.J. No. 5038.) Several courts have suggested that prior sexual history between the
accused and the complainant is admissible as part of the context in cases where the accused
maintains that she consented (See R v Strickland (2007) 45 C.R. (6th) 183). In those cases it is
admitted more to show a general history of sexual interaction – the specifics of communication of
consent are not necessarily relevant to this (arguably problematic) type of reasoning. As such,
those cases where it is admitted, and where the court does not stipulate whether it is relevant only
to consent or to mistaken belief in consent, cannot be relied on to support the argument made
herein. Of course, neither do they challenge the argument made here.
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In R v. Wilson, for example, the Ontario Court of Justice admitted evidence of
prior sexual history between the complainant and the accused as relevant to the defence
of mistaken belief in consent. It was admitted not to demonstrate his perception that
consent had been communicated prior to the alleged offence but simply to show that the
complainant had in the past consented to ‘unusual sex’:
The sex alleged, as perceived by Mr. Wilson, involves the unusual feature of
bondage. Any consent to such sex would necessarily be an exceptional consent.
Whether Mr. Wilson had received such consent from Ms. C. previously would be
a factor in the consideration of evidence of such a perception. 44
Consider also the case of R v B.J.S.45 In B.J.S. the accused was charged with
sexually assaulting his wife.46 The accused testified that he believed his wife had given
him permission to touch her for the purpose of inspecting her fidelity based on a prior
incident that had occurred in 1987. The Alberta Provincial Court admitted the evidence
of the 1987 incident – presumably a prior inspection – on the basis that it was
significantly probative of his mistaken belief that he had permission nearly twenty years
later to again ‘inspect’ his wife. The evidence was as to the fact of the prior supposedly
consensual vaginal examination and not as to how consent for that examination was
communicated nor as to why the fact of the prior sexual interaction evidenced his belief
that consent in the present circumstance was communicated.
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R v Wilson [2008], O.J. No. 3583.
[2005] A.J. No. 883.
46
In B.J.S., ibid. the Court found that in determining the admissibility of prior sexual history under
a section 276 application, the provisions of section 273.2 of the Criminal Code – which stipulate
that the defence of mistaken belief is not available where the belief arose from drunkenness,
recklessness, willful blindness or unreasonableness in the circumstances – were not relevant.
Setting aside whether this is the right approach, it should be noted that it is an approach that
broadens admissibility and thus favours the accused.
45
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These cases suggest that as pertains to the interplay between the use of prior sexual
history evidence and the application of the definition of consent in Ewanchuk, the
accused is not being treated unduly; if anything, in this context, courts have failed to
properly apply the definition of consent adopted in Ewanchuk in a way which favours the
accused.
ii) Cases With A History of Consensual ‘Rough Sex’
In cases involving sexual assault charges between sexual intimates, the impact of
Ewanchuk does not seem to have resulted in a more restrictive approach to the admission
of prior sexual history between the accused and the complainant as evidence to establish
an honest but mistaken belief in consent. Moving forward then, has the ‘communicative’
definition of consent (and its corresponding rejection of the doctrine of implied consent)
adopted in Ewanchuk resulted in an approach to consent that fails to accommodate the
complexity and diversity of sexual communications between intimate partners? The
litmus test to answer this question might be found by examining how courts, postEwanchuk, have approached cases where the accused bases his mistaken belief in consent
on a prior consensual sexual history between the accused and the complainant that
featured consensual sado-masochism or the role-playing of dominance and submission.
In fact, the communicative definition of consent found in Ewanchuk does not appear
to work any injustice to the accused in these types of cases. This is demonstrated by the
British Columbia Supreme Court’s appellate decision in R v Went.47 (Reliance on these
cases should not be taken as an assumption or assertion that these types of factual
circumstances represent the norm in spousal or intimate partner sexual assault cases.)
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[2004] B.C.J. No. 1900 [hereinafter Went].
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In Went the accused and the complainant had been in a healthy social and sexual
relationship for a number of years. The relationship frequently included role-playing
“forceful sex” and “insincere verbal exhortations” by the complainant to stop.48 Their
sex play included the accused “grabbing her hair during sex and gently pulling it,
engaging in activity which could be characterized as Mr. Went "taking" her, and the
initiation of oral sex by one partner pushing the head of the other partner into the
initiator's lap”.49 The Court noted that:
…of some importance in this case and in their relationship, Ms. D. agreed that
she, from time to time, would say "no" or "don't" in relation to the initiation of
sexual contact by Mr. Went when she did not mean for him to stop. In this
context, she agreed that she enjoyed and was aroused by being "taken" in a
sexual way.50
The complainant testified that on all of these occasions “her use of the words "no", "stop"
or "don't" during sexual activity were preceded by a direct or subtle invitation to sexual
activity, such as hugs or flirtation”.51
The charges arose as a result of a sexual interaction that the accused conceded
was not consensual; his defence was that he mistakenly believed that the complainant
was consenting. On the night of the incident the couple were watching a movie together
on her couch. The movie depicted a man having sex with a woman who had a plastic bag
over her head. The accused testified that the complainant said “see, she likes it”. The
complainant denied making this statement. The trial judge did not make a finding of fact
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Ibid. at para. 8.
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as to whether she made the statement. At some point the accused, as he had done in the
past, put his hand over the complainant’s mouth and nose to which she responded by
saying “don’t”.52 There was disagreement as to whether this was preceded by a hug. The
trial judge said he was unable to make a finding of fact on this point. The accused then
grabbed the back of her head and forced it into his lap to initiate oral sex – again as had
occurred in the past. Both parties agreed that she resisted all of this. The accused then
got on his knees in front of her and tried to remove her clothing. There was disagreement
as to whether she assisted in the removal of her clothing by lifting her bottom. The trial
judge did not make a finding of fact on this point either. After this the accused attempted
to initiate sexual intercourse at which time, according to him, the complainant’s
protestations finally registered with him and he realized that she was actually not
consenting. There was as noted above, agreement that the complainant was not
consenting; thus the actus reus was established. The sole issue was as to the accused’s
claim of mistaken belief in consent. In other words, as to whether there was evidence he
could rely upon to establish a mistaken belief that she had communicated consent.
The British Columbia Supreme Court allowed the defence and overturned his
conviction because the trial judge had not made a finding of fact as to whether the
consensual hug, positive comment about the film or assistance with the removal of her
pants had occurred. The benefit of the doubt of course goes to the accused. The accused,
then, was permitted to rely on his evidence (of the hug, comment, and hip lifting) to
allow the mistaken belief in consent defence. Presumably given all of the other evidence,
had the trial judge made a finding of fact that the hug had not occurred, that the
complainant had not made the comment about the film or lifted her hips the defence
52

Ibid. at para. 12.
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would not have been allowed. There are two important points to be noted about this case.
First, the British Columbia Supreme Court, despite suggesting otherwise, did apply the
communicative definition of consent established in Ewanchuk. While the Court both
misconstrued the definition of consent in Ewanchuk (by suggesting that Ewanchuk
precluded the possibility of relying upon ‘behavioral consent’53) and wrongly suggested
that Ewanchuk’s rejection of the doctrine of implied consent only applied in cases
involving strangers,54 the Court actually did go on to properly apply the analysis in
Ewanchuk and in doing so overturned the accused’s conviction.
Second, this was done in a manner that appears to have accommodated the very
specific sexual dynamics of the couple at issue in this case. Some courts are able to make
assessments as to what constitutes ambiguity in a particular sexual context. It seems that
both common sense and the Ewanchuk analysis are able to distinguish between relying as
an indication of consent on the lifting of one’s hips by a barely conscious and severely
intoxicated acquaintance55 and the lifting of one’s hips by a sexual partner with whom
one has a history of consensual dominance/submission sex play.56
iii) mistaken belief when intimate partners are ‘on the rocks’
53

Ewanchuk did not, as was suggested in Went, hold that an accused could not rely on evidence of
‘behavioral consent’ to establish a mistaken belief in consent. The Court in Ewanchuk did not
even employ the term ‘behavioral consent’. They did, however, establish that it is evidence of a
mistaken belief that consent was communicated through words or actions that raises an air of
reality to the defence. Presumably, actions would cover whatever concept the court in Went
intended by the term ‘behavioral consent’.
54
Went, supra note 47 at para. 22. In R v RV [2004] O.J. No. 5136 the Ontario Court of Appeal
held that the Ewanchuk analysis does apply in cases involving spouses.
55
See R v Cornejo, supra note 25.
56
Contrast the decision in Went with the outcome in R v J.A., [2008] O.J. No. 1583. In R v J.A the accused
was convicted of sexual assault after inserting a dildo into his partner’s anus while she was unconscious.
She had been rendered unconscious by the accused. The couple had on a number of occasions engaged in
‘breath play’ where one partner chokes the other to the point of unconsciousness. Anal penetration had not
in the past been a part of their sexual activities. Justice Nicholas convicted on the basis that there is no
defence of implied consent and, because the anal penetration was initiated while the complainant was
unconscious, it was not possible for her to have communicated consent. There was thus no evidence
possible of establishing consent or a mistaken belief in consent.
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The concern that Ewanchuk would unduly restrict an accused’s access to the
defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent in cases where the accused and the
complainant had been involved in an on going relationship has not been realized in postEwanchuk decisions. However, some post-Ewanchuk cases involving intimate partners
do indicate the possibility of a different problematic trend. This involves a failure on the
part of lower courts to consistently ascribe to the communicative notion of consent in
cases involving sexual assault allegations between long term intimate partners – more
specifically, in cases where an accused’s actions appear to be motivated by a desperate
attempt to ‘win back’ or ‘re-claim’ his partner.
In R v T.V. the accused and the complainant had been married for several years. 57
The complainant wanted to terminate the marriage. In addition to the charge of sexual
assault, for which he was acquitted, the accused was also charged with several other
offences including assault (for which he was convicted). The complainant had had an
affair that according to the judge had left the accused “devastated”, “heart broken” and
“angry” but still wanting to continue the marriage.58
Justice Baldwin commented that “[w]hat occurred between the parties during the
time period in question is a tale of betrayal and revenge”;59 according to the complainant
what occurred between the parties was a tale of violence, threats, sexual extortion and
sexual assault.
The incident from which the charge of sexual assault stemmed occurred on the
couple’s 16th engagement anniversary. The complainant testified that the sexual touching
was not consensual. She testified that she repeatedly said no, that she told the accused to
57
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get off of her and that he ignored her protests. The accused did not testify. His defence
was that the sexual interaction was consensual or that he had a mistaken belief that it was
consensual. The decision did not advert to any evidence that the accused could rely on to
establish his belief that consent was communicated – in fact quite the opposite. However
despite this, the Court found that there was an air of reality to the defence and ultimately
acquitted on this basis. Justice Baldwin stated that this case was nothing like Ewanchuk
because the couple here had been “sexually communicating” for years. Taking Justice
L’Heureux-Dube’s comment that there was nothing romantic about Ewanchuk’s actions
out of context, and distinguishing on the basis of it, he noted that
the accused was desperately trying to save the marriage. It was their engagement
anniversary and he had sent his wife flowers at work which she gave away to the
cleaning lady. He E-mailed her to come home so that they could have a special
dinner. She did not come home for dinner. He was trying to engage his wife
romantically throughout the day.60
Despite the finding that the complainant said she did not want to have sex61, and
despite there being no evidence that she communicated anything other than an explicit
lack of consent, the accused was acquitted on the basis that “the evidence here
established that the complainant submitted or did not resist to the sexual activity in
question because she was “tired” and “tiredness does not vitiate consent”. This was an
error of law. While tiredness may not vitiate consent, submission and a failure to resist
do not constitute consent.62
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Finding that the accused just “wanted to show her how much he loved her” the
Court noted that “although the complainant did not verbally agree to participate in the
sexual activity, her protestations to “let me go” [made while the accused "lightly pinned
her wrists to the side and slowly moved her PJ top up”63] can be understood to mean let
me go from this marriage.” To suggest that this analysis stretches the imagination is to
understate the situation.
In R v D.M., another case that involved an intimate couple, the Ontario Court of
Justice did acknowledge that Ewanchuk was binding authority on the issue of consent.64
However despite this, the reasoning in R v D.M. suggests an implicit rejection of
Ewanchuk – the recognition of an ‘implied implied consent’, so to speak.
In R v D.M. the accused was acquitted of sexually assaulting his girlfriend of two
years. A few minutes prior to the sexual touching from which the charges stemmed, the
accused had been advised by the complainant that she had been having sex with his
roommate. The incident started when the complainant entered his bedroom and lay on
the bed. He was upset and almost crying and began to rub the complainant’s stomach.
He then proceeded to touch her vagina. At this point she grabbed his wrist and tried to
pull his hand away. She was unable to do so. He penetrated her digitally and although
she told him to stop, he continued. Next she yelled (or screamed) at him to stop. From
here their evidence differed. He said he stopped at this point. She said he did not stop
and that she continued to yell and scream and it was only after she pried his fingers out of
her and fell off the bed that he stopped. The yelling and screaming was sufficiently loud
that the next door neighbors called the police.
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The Ontario Court of Justice cited Ewanchuk and noted that “speculation by the
accused as to what the complainant may be thinking does not provide the accused with a
defence. The accused must believe that the complainant effectively said, "Yes" through
her words or a combination of her words and her actions.”65 Despite acknowledging this
point of law, and despite that, even on the accused’s own testimony, he continued the
sexual touching at least until after the first time and up until the second time that the
complainant had told him to stop, the accused was acquitted on the basis of an honest but
mistaken belief in consent. The evidence the Court relied on in order to establish an air
of reality to the accused’s belief that she had communicated consent was the fact that “on
at least one prior occasion during an act of sexual intercourse the complainant had uttered
the word "no", which had meant she was uncomfortable and was requesting a change of
position.”
In terms of evidence capable of supporting the honesty and reasonableness of his
belief that her screams (screams loud enough to cause the neighbors to call the police)
during this incident were the same as her ‘uttering the word no’ so that the accused might
change position during a previous sexual encounter, the Court relied on the following: the
fact that the complainant proposed to sleep in his bed; the accused’s calm demeanor both
pre and post incident despite having just discovered that his girlfriend had slept with his
best friend; the fact that he calmly tried to kiss and hug the complainant after the incident;
and his lack of sophistication on the stand.
One cannot help noting that in both R v T.V. and R v D.M. the female
complainants had engaged in sex outside of the relationship and that in both cases the

65

Ibid. at para. 87

28

judges made more than passing reference to these women’s infidelities and the emotional
impact that this had on the accused.
In R v C.M.M the Nova Scotia Provincial Court found an accused who had broken
into his estranged wife’s house, found a gun and threatened her with it before putting it
away (after it had accidently been fired) and having intercourse with her, had an honest
but mistaken belief she was consenting.66 The judge found that the accused entered the
house intending only to let his wife know how he felt, that he found the gun after he
arrived, and that he intended only to scare her with it. The gun went off accidentally and
he laid it aside immediately. Despite finding that the accused intended to scare his wife
with the gun, the judge determined that in the accused’s mind, this was not a factor in the
sexual assault. He found that the accused’s wife had led him to believe, by her words and
conduct, that she was consenting to the sexual intercourse.
It may be that it is trial judges in particular who are less willing to recognize that
the doctrine of implied consent to sexual interactions no longer exists, even as between
spouses. In addition to the two cases just discussed – which were not appealed – trial
judges in R v MacFie and R v R.V. refused to, or failed to, apply Ewanchuk.
The trial judge in R v R.V., in acquitting the accused husband, ignored
Ewanchuk.67 He held that as between husbands and wives an implied doctrine of consent
to sexual touching exists and that even proof that the wife said no and the husband knew
she said no was not sufficient.68 “I am of the view that where a viable marital
66
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relationship exists, then it is not enough for the Crown to simply prove that the sexual
conduct took place without the stated consent of the other party in order to secure a
conviction for sexual assault by one marital partner against the other.”69
The trial judge in R v MacFie also found that an ex-husband who violently
abducted his estranged wife and had sexual intercourse with her in the back of his van in
a deserted gravel pit had a mistaken belief that she was consenting.70 The acquittal was
set-aside on appeal on the basis that there is no air of reality to a kidnapper’s claim to
have honestly believed his hostage was consenting to the sexual assault.
Recall that the trial judge in R v Went also stated that the Ewanchuk standard
should be applied only between strangers and not intimates (although he went on to adopt
an analysis which did properly Ewanchuk).
Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ewanchuk engendered a great deal of
controversy, some of it stemming from the concern that the communicative notion of
consent adopted by the Court would unjustly deny the defence of honest but mistaken
belief in consent to certain accused. In particular there was concern for those whose
harmless sexual overtures were, unbeknownst to them, unrequited. There was also
concern that the Court’s explicit rejection of the doctrine of implied consent could not
justly be applied to husbands and boyfriends charged with sexual assault.
A review of the reported cases, since 1998, in which the mistaken belief in
consent defence arose demonstrates that cases with the types of ambiguity envisaged by
upheld by the Ontario Superior Court, R v R.V. (2004), 61 W.C.B. (2d) 57 but was ultimately overturned
by the Ontario Court of Appeal [2004] O.J. No. 5136.
69
Supra note 67 at para. 14.
70
[2001] A.J. No. 152. The accused killed the complainant three days after the abduction and
sexual assault.
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Ewanchuk’s critics have not come before the courts. The cases also demonstrate that the
Ewanchuk analysis, properly interpreted, does not unjustly criminalize the progression of
intimate behavior between genuinely consenting adults, and that where a legitimate
confusion exists courts appear able to apply a communicative concept of consent that can
accommodate the diversity and specificity with which sexual interactions tend to occur.
Less promisingly, decisions in cases such as R v T.V.,71 R v R.V.,72 R v. D.M.,73 R v
C.M.M.74 and R v MacFie75 suggest that in circumstances involving intimate partners or
spouses, trial judges may be more willing to resort to reasoning that wrongly relies on the
assumption that as between spouses the doctrine of implied consent still exists.
Ewanchuk, it seems, has done much to achieve better respect from the law for the sexual
integrity of the intoxicated party-goer.76 The trial decisions discussed in the last section
suggest Ewanchuk has been less able to achieve this with respect to the sexual integrity of
wives and girlfriends.
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